• Global sea-surface temperatures reached a record 21.1°C as a strong El Niño develops
• Southern Africa faces renewed risks across crops, water availability and hydropower
• The 2026/27 season will test whether regional recovery has rebuilt economic resilience

Harare - Global sea surface temperatures reached 21.1°C on 22 August 2026, the highest daily reading in Copernicus records dating to 1979.

The new peak exceeded the previous 21.09°C record set in March 2024 and arrived at an unusual point in the seasonal cycle, several months after global ocean temperatures normally reach their annual maximum. Copernicus attributes the broader trend to persistent long-term ocean warming, with the developing El Niño now adding further heat to an already elevated global ocean system.

The distinction between the ocean record and El Niño strength is important. A record global sea surface temperature does not automatically make El Niño stronger. El Niño intensity is determined by warming in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific together with the atmospheric response. The World Meteorological Organization already expects the 2026 event to reach strong intensity, with multi-model forecasts putting the seasonal sea surface temperature anomaly at about 2.9°C during August to October and an intensification trajectory peaking around November.

The record ocean temperature changes the background climate in which that El Niño is developing. A warmer ocean transfers more heat and moisture into the atmosphere, raises the potential for intense rainfall in some regions and increases heat stress where rainfall weakens. WMO also expects a positive Indian Ocean Dipole to develop alongside El Niño, adding another climate driver capable of influencing rainfall around Africa and the wider Indian Ocean basin.

Africa will not experience that combination uniformly. Current forecasts for the Greater Horn point towards warmer and wetter conditions during the final quarter of 2026, with particularly high probabilities of enhanced rainfall across southern Ethiopia, parts of Somalia and northeastern Kenya. The same ocean and atmospheric system can therefore raise flood and infrastructure risks in East Africa while increasing drought and heat exposure across parts of Southern Africa.

Southern Africa carries a recent benchmark for the economic consequences. The 2023/24 El Niño became strong by the end of 2023 and peaked during November 2023 to January 2024 with an Oceanic Niño Index of 2.0°C, the fifth-highest peak recorded since 1950. The event subsequently coincided with severe drought across large parts of Southern Africa.

Agriculture absorbed the first impact. WMO reported that aggregate cereal yields across Southern Africa fell 16% below the five-year average, while some individual economies experienced substantially larger losses. Zambia recorded a decline of about 43% and Zimbabwe about 50% relative to their five-year averages. The drought weakened household food stocks, reduced livestock conditions and pushed several governments towards emergency food assistance and additional grain imports.

Zimbabwe’s experience shows how quickly the weather shock moved into the wider economy. The World Bank estimates that the 2023/24 El Niño drought reduced maize yields by 60% relative to the five-year average, generated roughly US$363 million in damages and losses and contributed to a projected 3.2% reduction in GDP relative to a no-drought scenario. The fiscal deficit was projected to widen by about 0.9% of GDP through weaker revenue and higher expenditure requirements.

The same rainfall shock reached electricity through the Zambezi basin. Lower inflows into Lake Kariba reduced hydroelectric generation in Zambia and Zimbabwe, weakening power supply at the same time that agriculture was already under stress. The economic transmission therefore extended from rain-fed crops into mining, manufacturing and services through electricity availability.

That experience gives the developing 2026 El Niño a different significance for Southern Africa. The region is entering another strong climate cycle only two years after drought exposed the dependence of food systems, hydropower and public finances on seasonal rainfall.

The higher global ocean temperature does not establish that the 2026 event will produce a more severe Southern African drought than 2023/24. El Niño impacts vary with event strength, timing, duration and interaction with other climate drivers. WMO explicitly cautions that seasonal forecasts are probabilistic and that even strong El Niño events can produce different local outcomes.

The combination does increase the possibility of compound stress. Higher baseline temperatures raise evaporation and crop-water demand. Soil moisture can deteriorate faster when rainfall weakens. Livestock faces additional heat stress. Reservoir losses can accelerate through evaporation. Industrial and household electricity demand can increase during hotter conditions while hydropower availability becomes more sensitive to catchment inflows.

Southern Africa’s exposure therefore extends through several connected systems.

Agriculture remains heavily rain-fed across much of the region. A weak season can reduce maize and other staple production, raise import requirements and place pressure on food prices. Several economies can experience the shock simultaneously, reducing the amount of surplus grain available within the region. Importing from global markets then introduces additional freight and foreign currency costs.

Hydropower creates another regional link. Zimbabwe and Zambia share Lake Kariba, while other Southern African systems also depend on hydroelectric generation. Weak rainfall can therefore tighten electricity supply across several economies at the same time. Regional power trading provides support only where neighbouring systems retain enough surplus capacity to export.

The industrial effect becomes larger as mining and manufacturing investment expands. Zambia is targeting higher copper production. Zimbabwe is adding new mining and processing capacity across gold, lithium and PGMs while Manhize has restored large-scale steel production. These investments require dependable electricity and water through operating cycles measured in decades.

The 2023/24 drought showed that climate risk can therefore enter industrial economics through infrastructure.

Large plants can partly protect themselves through captive generation, storage and alternative water systems. Dinson’s Manhize steel complex has incorporated dedicated generation and waste-heat recovery into its production architecture. Waste heat and gases generated through steelmaking can be converted into additional electricity, reducing part of the plant’s dependence on external supply.

That model improves resilience at project level. The regional challenge is broader because most manufacturers, agricultural processors and suppliers cannot finance dedicated infrastructure. Southern Africa’s climate resilience therefore depends increasingly on the quality of shared electricity, water and transport systems capable of absorbing shocks without forcing each industrial user to build its own alternative.

Zimbabwe provides one of the clearest tests of whether that resilience has improved since 2024.

The country enters the 2026/27 season after a much stronger agricultural cycle. Grain availability has recovered and households in major producing areas enter the new season with a larger food buffer than they carried into the previous drought. The economic value of that recovery will be visible in how long domestic stocks can support consumption if rainfall deteriorates.

Grain reserves provide the first measurement. Larger stocks can delay the point at which shortages translate into imports and higher prices. Strategic reserves provide additional policy capacity. Irrigation creates another buffer by allowing part of agricultural production to continue independently of seasonal rainfall.

Water storage then connects agriculture to electricity. Dam levels and Zambezi catchment inflows will determine how much hydroelectric generation remains available through a weak rainfall cycle. Thermal generation, independent power producers and electricity imports will determine how much of any hydro shortfall reaches industry and households.

Food prices complete the macroeconomic transmission. A climate shock becomes considerably more disruptive when lower crop production raises grain imports, food inflation and government support requirements at the same time that electricity shortages weaken productive output.

The 2026 event therefore arrives with a measurable regional test.Southern Africa has had two years since the 2023/24 drought to rebuild grain stocks, restore agricultural output, invest in irrigation, strengthen energy supply and improve early warning systems. The approaching El Niño will show how much of that recovery changed the region’s underlying exposure.

The indicators will become visible before final crop estimates are available. Rainfall distribution will establish the early agricultural trajectory. Reservoir inflows will reveal the hydrological position. Maize prices and grain stocks will show how quickly food availability is tightening. Electricity imports and load restrictions will expose pressure on the power system. Government grain purchases and fiscal support will show how much of the climate shock is moving onto public balance sheets.

The record 21.1°C ocean temperature provides the global setting for that audit. The 2026 El Niño is already forecast to be strong, and it is developing within an exceptionally warm ocean system. That combination raises the potential for more severe heat and rainfall extremes without establishing the exact outcome for any individual African country.

Africa’s economic exposure will therefore be determined region by region. East Africa is preparing for enhanced rainfall and flood risk. Southern Africa is entering a season where hotter conditions and the historical El Niño relationship increase concern around agriculture, water and hydropower.

The recent past provides the benchmark. The 2023/24 event cut harvests, weakened Kariba generation and reduced economic growth. The 2026 cycle will establish whether Southern Africa rebuilt enough resilience between those events to prevent another weather shock from becoming another food, electricity and macroeconomic shock.

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