• First Mutual Properties is pursuing voluntary delistings from the ZSE in 2026, driven by chronic undervaluation, thin liquidity, and limited investor participation
• The wave of recent delistings spans sectors and includes voluntary migrations to VFEX, corporate distress exits, and low-liquidity frustrations
• The VFEX has outperformed significantly (70% All Share Index gain in 2025), attracting listings and highlighting structural divergences that could further erode the ZSE

First Mutual Properties and Econet Wireless Zimbabwe are the latest casualties in a growing wave of delistings that is stripping the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange of its most prominent counters, and raising urgent questions about the future of Zimbabwe's public equity markets.

Harare- First Mutual Properties Limited (FMP), one of Zimbabwe's most recognised real estate investment companies, has confirmed that it is engaged in active negotiations to evaluate a potential transaction that could result in its voluntary delisting from the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE).

The announcement, while not unexpected to seasoned observers of the local bourse, represents yet another high-profile name signalling a desire to exit a public market that many companies now regard as more burden than benefit.

Formerly known as Pearl Properties, FMP listed on the ZSE in 2007 and has since built a formidable presence in Zimbabwe's commercial property landscape. As at November 2025, the company's portfolio was valued at approximately US$138 million, encompassing 41 buildings with a total lettable area of 124,178 square metres.

Its holdings span office parks, retail spaces, and commercial properties, with flagship assets including Arundel Office Park, the newly constructed Arundel Office Extension, Pearl House, and First Mutual Park.

That a company of such substance should contemplate walking away from public markets speaks volumes about the structural challenges facing the ZSE.

The announcement comes just weeks before what could be the most consequential delisting in the ZSE's history. Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Limited, the telecommunications titan founded and controlled by billionaire entrepreneur Strive Masiyiwa, is advancing plans for a full voluntary delisting.

An Extraordinary General Meeting will be convened on the 26^th of February 2026, to seek shareholder approval for the move. If approved, the delisting is expected to take effect on March 31, 2026,  the same date that its newly formed infrastructure subsidiary, Econet Infrastructure Company Limited (Econet InfraCo), is scheduled to list on the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX).

The departure of Econet, which accounts for approximately 35% of the ZSE's total market capitalisation would represent a seismic shock to what is already a fragile and thinly traded exchange.

The reasons cited by departing companies follow a remarkably consistent pattern. For Econet, the primary driver is chronic undervaluation. The company argues that its shares have traded for years at a significant discount to comparable African telecom operators, which typically command enterprise value to EBITDA multiples of six to eight times.

Econet contends that by retaining ownership of its passive infrastructure assets,  towers, real estate, and power systems rather than separating them into a dedicated vehicle as regional peers have done, the ZSE has been unable to properly price the underlying value of those assets within a blended structure.

The company's planned spin-off of Econet InfraCo, to be valued at approximately US$1 billion as a standalone entity, is designed to unlock that latent value by placing the infrastructure business in a market better equipped to appreciate it.

As part of its exit package, Econet is offering shareholders a floor price of US$0.50 per share, structured as US$0.17 in cash and US$0.33 in shares of Econet InfraCo. Up to 30% of InfraCo's equity will be allocated to settling exit offers, with Econet Wireless retaining a 70% controlling stake in the new entity.

Leading brokerage FBC Securities has endorsed the undervaluation argument, stating that the ZSE's pricing of Econet has for years reflected tradability constraints rather than genuine business fundamentals  a damning assessment of the exchange's core function.

For First Mutual Properties, the story is different in specifics but similar in theme. The commercial property sector offers relatively stable, predictable cash flows backed by hard assets, precisely the kind of income profile that should attract institutional and long-term investors.

Yet on a bourse characterised by thin volumes and limited participation from foreign and institutional capital, even a well-managed property company with a US$138 million portfolio struggles to achieve a share price that reflects its net asset value. The result is a persistent discount that serves neither the company's shareholders nor its ability to raise growth capital through the public markets.

National Tyre Services (NTS), which issued its own delisting notice in late 2025, framed the problem in blunt terms when it stated that sustained low liquidity on the ZSE had undermined effective price discovery and limited shareholders' ability to realise value or exit their investment positions. That NTS, a specialist distributor, not a blue-chip conglomerate arrived at the same conclusion as Econet underlines how pervasive these frustrations have become across sectors and company sizes.

The current wave of delistings did not emerge overnight. It reflects a deterioration in market conditions that has been building for years, accelerated by Zimbabwe's currency instability, tight monetary policy, and the sustained hollowing out of the domestic institutional investor base

The departures span multiple sectors and motivations. In some cases, such as Khayah Cement and Truworths, delistings were driven by corporate distress rather than strategic choice. Khayah, formerly Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe, entered voluntary corporate rescue in December 2024 after struggling with inherited debt from its acquisition by Fossil Mines, kiln shutdowns, and the competitive pressure of cheaper imported cement following a government policy change in 2024.

By May 2025, shareholders had passed a resolution to terminate its listing, with the company unable to meet its regulatory disclosure obligations or cover its listing fees. The delisting of Truworths in July 2025, after 44 years on the exchange followed a similar trajectory: corporate rescue proceedings initiated in August 2024, a subsequent acquisition of the company by Valfin Investments for the nominal sum of US$1, and a shareholder vote in February 2025 to delist.

Other exits have been more deliberate. Simbisa Brands, the fast-food and restaurant operator, chose to delist in November 2022 and listed on VFEX. GetBucks Zimbabwe exited in 2023 amid low trading volumes and a reassessment of the costs and benefits of a public listing. The Old Mutual Top Ten ETF was terminated in early 2025, reflecting a broader rationalisation of the exchange-traded product landscape in a market where investor appetite for passive instruments remains shallow.

In each case, the destination after leaving the ZSE has varied. Some companies have transitioned entirely to private status. Others, like Econet InfraCo, are migrating to the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange, Zimbabwe's US dollar-denominated bourse, which has emerged as the preferred platform for companies seeking hard-currency pricing and access to a more liquid, internationally oriented investor base.

The VFEX recorded a 70% gain in its All Share Index in 2025, more than double the ZSE's performance, and turnover nearly doubled year-on-year, a stark illustration of the divergence between the two exchanges.

STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF THE CRISIS

To understand why companies are leaving the ZSE, one must understand the feedback loop that has taken hold in Zimbabwe's equity markets. Low liquidity discourages institutional and foreign investors, who require the ability to build and exit positions at scale without moving the market. The absence of these investors reduces the quality of price discovery, causing shares to trade at discounts to intrinsic value.

Those discounts make equity issuance unattractive as a fundraising mechanism, removing a key incentive for remaining listed. And as high-quality companies delist, the exchange becomes less relevant, further reducing liquidity and investor interest.

Trading activity on the ZSE has become dangerously concentrated. The top five counters by volume account for nearly 90 percent of daily turnover, a figure that ZSE CEO Justin Bgoni himself acknowledged as unhealthy, while pledging to market the remaining 40-plus listed companies more aggressively to investors.

With Econet alone constituting roughly a third of market capitalisation, its departure would not merely remove a single counter; it would fundamentally alter the character and depth of the exchange.

Zimbabwe's currency history has compounded these challenges. For years, shares on the ZSE functioned partly as an inflation hedge rather than a genuine investment instrument, attracting short-term speculative capital rather than long-term institutional money.

The introduction of the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency in April 2024 brought a degree of monetary stability that, paradoxically, has clarified the scale of the underlying liquidity problem: once currency was no longer an issue driving speculative flows, the thinness of genuine investment demand became impossible to ignore. The tight monetary policy stance adopted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to support the ZiG has further constrained available liquidity, squeezing the market from two directions simultaneously.

The cost and regulatory burden of maintaining a public listing also weighs heavily on smaller companies. Khayah Cement explicitly cited its inability to submit timely financial reports and meet listing fee obligations as factors in its decision to delist. For companies operating in sectors facing structural headwinds like retail, manufacturing, construction, the costs of compliance with ZSE requirements can consume management attention and resources that are desperately needed elsewhere.

The VFEX recorded a 70% gain in 2025, more than double the ZSE's performance, a big illustration of the growing divergence between Zimbabwe's two exchanges.

The rise of the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange has been both a symptom and a cause of the ZSE's challenges. Established to attract foreign investment through hard-currency pricing and a lighter regulatory touch, the VFEX has delivered impressive returns and growing turnover. Its 2025 performance was driven largely by gold mining companies benefiting from elevated global gold prices, but the exchange has also attracted listings in infrastructure, resources, and now potentially a major telecom infrastructure vehicle in Econet InfraCo.

The dual-exchange dynamic creates complications for the ZSE. On one hand, the VFEX provides an alternative platform for companies that might otherwise exit Zimbabwe's public markets entirely , a partial mitigation of the delisting trend. On the other, it siphons away precisely the types of companies and investors that the ZSE needs to restore its relevance.

Companies that migrate from the ZSE to the VFEX are, in effect, choosing a different segment of Zimbabwe's capital market rather than abandoning public markets wholesale. But for ZSE-listed retail investors without easy access to VFEX instruments, the net effect is indistinguishable from a full exit.

ZSE CEO Justin Bgoni, who also serves as CEO of the VFEX, has sought to frame the two exchanges as complementary rather than competing platforms, arguing that the VFEX's success in attracting mining and infrastructure listings fills a gap that the ZSE, with its ZiG-denominated structure, cannot easily address.

But the optics of the same individual overseeing both a booming VFEX and a depleted ZSE are not easily managed, and questions about capital allocation between the two platforms will intensify if the current trend continues.

WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE

The case for reform is not difficult to make. Zimbabwe needs functional capital markets that can intermediate savings into productive investment, price assets efficiently, and provide companies with a credible mechanism for raising growth equity. The ZSE, in its current state, is performing none of these functions adequately.

Addressing the liquidity problem requires a multi-pronged approach. Pension funds and insurance companies, which represent the most natural source of long-term institutional demand in any market, need to be empowered, and required, where appropriate to deepen their ZSE exposures.

Foreign investor participation, which has been constrained by currency controls, repatriation uncertainty, and the risk discount embedded in Zimbabwe's sovereign risk profile, needs to be made structurally more accessible. The regulatory environment must be calibrated to reduce the cost burden on smaller companies without undermining the disclosure standards that protect investors.

The ZSE must also reckon with its identity in an era when the VFEX offers a compelling hard-currency alternative. A clearer delineation of the types of companies and investors best served by each platform, combined with greater interoperability between them, could reduce the winner-takes-all dynamic that is currently accelerating capital migration to the VFEX. Coordination between the ZSE, the VFEX, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe (SECZ), and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe will be essential if a coherent capital market strategy is to emerge.

For First Mutual Properties, the decision to delist, if it proceeds  is ultimately a rational response to an irrational market environment. A company with US$138 million in high-quality commercial real estate assets should not face persistent undervaluation on a public exchange. The failure is not FMP's; it is the market's.

And until that market is fixed, the exodus is likely to continue.

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