•  Small-scale deliveries to Fidelity fell 30.8% in March 2026 to 1,748.70 kilograms, while large-scale deliveries increased 24.6%.
• RBZ suspended the 90% USD and 10% ZiG settlement arrangement on 24 March after payment-processing and banking-access problems.
• April small-scale deliveries recovered 20.7%, although monthly data alone cannot isolate the policy effect from production and market factors.

Harare - Zimbabwe’s small-scale gold miners delivered 1,748.70 kilograms to Fidelity Gold Refinery in March 2026, down from 2,525.65 kilograms in February. The 776.95-kilogram contraction followed the introduction of a requirement to settle 10% of their gold proceeds in ZiG. Large-scale producers moved in the opposite direction, delivering 1,105.31 kilograms in March against 887.30 kilograms in February. The figures provide an unusually clear opportunity to examine the sensitivity of formal gold deliveries to payment arrangements.

Fidelity began implementing the 90% US dollar and 10% ZiG settlement framework in early March, following the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s February Monetary Policy Statement. The central bank said the change was intended to address arbitrage between payment regimes for large and small producers. Small-scale miners had previously received their proceeds entirely in foreign currency. The Monetary Policy Committee suspended the arrangement on 24 March, citing operational difficulties at Fidelity and the limited access of many artisanal miners to banking services.

The monthly data put the scale of the disturbance into perspective. Small-scale deliveries fell 30.8% between February and March. Large-scale deliveries increased 24.6%, leaving total gold deliveries at approximately 2,854 kilograms, down 16.4%. Small-scale miners accounted for about 74% of the combined February volume and 61% in March. A movement of nearly 13 percentage points in one month warrants scrutiny because these producers ordinarily supply the majority of gold entering the formal system.

The fall was also visible against the corresponding month of 2025. Small-scale deliveries of 1,864.99 kilograms in March 2025 exceeded the March 2026 figure by 116.29 kilograms. Large-scale deliveries rose from 969.28 kilograms to 1,105.31 kilograms over the same comparison. Month-on-month and year-on-year measures therefore identify a concentrated weakness in the small-scale segment. They cannot, by themselves, assign that weakness entirely to the new payment rule.

Source: Fidelity Gold Refinery figures reported by Equity Axis; calculations and chart: Equity Axis Research.

Gold deliveries measure sales to Fidelity during a reporting period. They do not measure ore extracted during the same month. Miners can hold bullion, postpone sales, alter their selling routes or experience delays between extraction and settlement. Weather, equipment failures, ore grades, international gold prices and financing conditions can also affect deliveries. Establishing a causal effect from the ZiG requirement would require daily or weekly purchase records, payment dates and comparable production information.

The financial mechanism is nevertheless identifiable. Small-scale operations often purchase diesel, machinery components, explosives and imported consumables in US dollars. A miner paid partly in ZiG may need to exchange that portion to finance the next production cycle. The cost depends on the effective conversion rate and the proportion of operating expenses that can be settled directly in local currency. A requirement expressed as 10% of proceeds can therefore have a different economic burden across mines with different cost structures.

Consider a hypothetical US$10,000 gold sale. Under the revised settlement arrangement, US$9,000 would be received in dollars and the local-currency equivalent of US$1,000 would be paid in ZiG at the applicable official rate. If the effective rate for converting that ZiG back into dollars were 25% higher than the official rate, its dollar purchasing power would be US$800. The implied loss would be US$200, or 2% of the original sale. This calculation is illustrative and does not establish the actual exchange losses incurred by miners.

The same model shows why access to banking matters. A miner with a functional account, suppliers accepting ZiG and predictable settlement times faces a different financing position from an operator paid through an intermediary. Delayed payments also carry costs when workers and suppliers expect immediate settlement. The Reserve Bank’s suspension acknowledged implementation constraints. Measuring their incidence would require records of rejected transactions, payment delays, account ownership and the actual currency composition of mine expenditures.

April provides a limited observation of the period after suspension. Small-scale deliveries recovered to 2,110.66 kilograms, up approximately 20.7% from March, although they were still below February. Large-scale deliveries increased further to 1,213.94 kilograms. Total April deliveries reached 3,324.59 kilograms. The recovery is consistent with improved conditions for formal sales, but the monthly comparison cannot separate the policy reversal from seasonal production, prices or changes in miners’ cash positions.

The first four months also show how one weak month affects the composition of national output. Small-scale deliveries totalled approximately 8,621.57 kilograms, compared with 4,014.96 kilograms from large producers. Small-scale miners supplied about 68.2% of the period’s gold deliveries. A payment policy that affects their selling decisions can therefore alter official monthly supply even when the physical stock of gold available for sale changes by less.

The central bank’s stated concern about regulatory arbitrage deserves an empirical test of its own. Where producers receive different foreign-currency retention terms, incentives may arise to route gold through the category offering more favourable settlement. Identifying such activity requires transaction-level evidence on sellers, production sites, volumes and beneficial ownership. Aggregate delivery figures cannot establish that large producers were using small-scale channels, or quantify how much gold changed route.

A useful sensitivity exercise would calculate the value of the ZiG component under several exchange-rate premiums. At a 10% premium, the US$1,000 equivalent converts to approximately US$909, implying a US$91 loss. At 20%, its value falls to US$833, or a US$167 loss. At 40%, the amount is worth about US$714, giving a US$286 loss. These estimates exclude conversion fees, transport to banking facilities and payment delays. They are economic scenarios, not claims about rates actually paid during March. Actual rates would need contemporaneous transaction records and verified market quotations.

The comparison with large producers also requires care because the two groups operated under different payment arrangements and production technologies. Industrial mines have more predictable milling schedules and may hold cash reserves sufficient to absorb temporary settlement problems. Small operations frequently finance fuel and milling from their latest gold sale. A payment delay of several days can interrupt a mining cycle if suppliers require dollars in advance. Interviews with miners and Fidelity agents could test these channels by recording days between delivery and settlement, cash needs per shift and the share of expenditures settled in ZiG.

The March 2026 gold-payment episode exposed the sensitivity of Zimbabwe’s formal gold market to changes in settlement arrangements. Small-scale deliveries fell sharply during the month, with the 10% ZiG payment requirement introducing an additional consideration for miners whose operating expenses are largely denominated in US dollars. The subsequent suspension of the requirement raises questions about the financial costs of currency conversion, payment accessibility and the incentives governing formal gold sales. Weekly delivery records and actual settlement transactions would help establish the extent to which these factors influenced miners’ decisions. For a sector accounting for nearly three-quarters of Zimbabwe’s gold deliveries in 2025, the relationship between payment policy and formal-market participation has direct consequences for gold mobilisation, export earnings and the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Equity Axis News