• Cabinet has approved the Constitution Amendment (No. 3) Bill, 2026, extending presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years and
  • This will shift presidential election from direct popular vote to parliamentary selection
  • ZANU-PF regained the required two-thirds parliamentary majority after recalls of opposition MPs turning the post-2023 election balance into a supermajority
  • The changes introduce a trajectory that tests whether extended executive tenure can deliver policy continuity and economic stability without weakening institutional checks

           

         

 

Harare- Zimbabwe's Cabinet has approved draft legislation for the Constitution Amendment (No. 3) Bill, 2026, proposing transformative changes that could extend presidential terms from five to seven years and shift the election of the president from direct popular vote to parliamentary selection.

Announced on February 10, 2026, just days before the current date, these amendments, if passed would potentially allow incumbent President Emmerson Mnangagwa, now 83, to remain in office until 2030, bypassing the 2028 end of his second term under the existing 2013 Constitution.

Legal experts argue that altering term limits requires a national referendum and cannot retroactively benefit a sitting president, setting the stage for intense parliamentary debates, court challenges, and public scrutiny.

The proposals mark a pivotal shift in Zimbabwe's governance framework, rooted in the 2013 Constitution forged during the Government of National Unity (GNU) era from 2009 to 2013. That period, following the disputed 2008 elections, united ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) factions in a power-sharing deal that stabilized the economy through dollarisation, curbed hyperinflation, and spurred GDP growth averaging 10% annually.

The Constitution embedded key safeguards, including a two-term presidential limit of five years each, to prevent indefinite rule and foster institutional checks. It was hailed as a national compact promoting generational renewal and investor confidence, attracting renewed interest in sectors like mining and finance.

However, the current amendments threaten to unravel these pillars, extending not only presidential terms but also parliamentary ones to seven years, while empowering the president to appoint an additional 10 senators, expanding the Senate to 90 seats.

Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi presented the bill as a means to enhance stability, but critics, including the Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC), label it a regression to authoritarianism.

In the August 2023 general elections, ZANU-PF secured 177 seats in the 280-member National Assembly, 137 from direct constituencies, 33 from women's quotas, and 7 from youth quotas granting a simple majority but falling short of the two-thirds super-majority (187 seats) needed for constitutional amendments.

The CCC, led by Nelson Chamisa, captured 103 seats (73 direct, 27 women's, 3 youth), dominating urban areas while ZANU-PF retained its rural stronghold. This balance suggested a potential check on executive overreach. Yet, within months, ZANU-PF orchestrated a comeback through controversial recalls that decimated the opposition's presence.

Central to this was Sengezo Tshabangu, a self-proclaimed interim secretary-general of the CCC, who initiated a wave of recalls starting in October 2023. Tshabangu, whose authority was fiercely disputed by CCC leadership as fraudulent and unauthorized, recalled 15 MPs, 9 senators, and 17 councillors in his first batch, citing party disloyalty.

Despite CCC protests and a letter from Chamisa urging Parliament Speaker Jacob Mudenda to ignore the "fake" correspondence riddled with errors, the recalls proceeded. High Court challenges by affected MPs failed, with judges ruling the applications defective for not properly citing the CCC as a party.

Tshabangu escalated, recalling another 13 MPs and 5 senators in November 2023, and more in subsequent rounds, triggering by-elections on November 11, 2023; December 9, 2023; February 3, 2024; and April 27, 2024.

The by-elections proved decisive: ZANU-PF swept most vacated seats, including all six in the February 2024 round, pushing its National Assembly tally to over 190 seats and securing the two-thirds majority by early 2024.

These developments reshape investor perceptions across policy predictability, institutional durability, and regime risk. The 2013 Constitution's term limits once signalled stability, drawing FDI inflows that peaked at USD 545 million in 2018 amid post-Mugabe optimism.

However, the 2017 transition under Mnangagwa initially sparked enthusiasm but faltered due to currency volatility and policy inconsistency, with inflation spiking to 175% in 2019 before stabilising around 50% by 2025 through partial re-dollarisation.

The proposed amendments introduce uncertainty: Foreign investors may adopt a "wait-and-see" approach, with portfolio flows remaining tactical. Data from the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency shows FDI dipped 15% in 2024 amid political turbulence from the recalls, and similar hesitation could follow.

For domestic capital, extended tenure might promise continuity, but global ratings agencies like Moody's (Caa3 rating as of 2025) warn of heightened governance risks, potentially widening currency risk premia on the Zimbabwe Gold (ZWG) currency.

Geopolitically, Zimbabwe's shift aligns with a global recalibration where democratic norms yield to resource pragmatism. With vast reserves of lithium (Africa's largest at 500,000 tonnes proven), platinum (second globally), gold and chrome, the country is pivotal in the energy transition.

China's Belt and Road investments, totalling USD 2.5 billion in mining since 2018, prioritize access over governance, as seen in deals with Tsingshan Holdings for ferrochrome processing. Western powers, facing supply chain pressures, have softened ideological stances; the U.S. "America First" policy and EU internal challenges dilute enforcement of democratic conditionality.

African peers like Rwanda (under Paul Kagame's extended rule) and Namibia (SWAPO dominance) offer blended models of centralized control with economic functionality, which Zimbabwe may emulate.

Yet, this "blended governance" risks entrenching populism without inclusive growth. Zimbabwe's history from the 2000-2008 land reforms isolating markets to the GNU's revival shows political instability erodes capital.

The amendments could consolidate executive power, but without bolstering central bank independence or fiscal transparency, they may widen inequalities. Opposition resistance, confined to legal avenues given limited civil mobilization post-2023 crackdowns, is unlikely to halt the bill in a ZANU-PF-dominated Parliament.

In forecast, the next 24 months may see cautious foreign engagement, with mining giants like Rio Tinto (exploring lithium) proceeding under enforceable contracts despite risks. Domestic markets, anchored by pension funds, could remain resilient if infrastructure rollout continues.

However, if amendments weaken checks without economic dividends, risk premia could rise, stalling recovery. Zimbabwe's inflection point tests whether political consolidation can foster stability or deepen isolation. Credible management could reprice risks downward; otherwise, it reinforces a cycle of uncertainty in this resource-rich nation.

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